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1. Background and Motivation 
 
 
Sri Lanka has been going through a demographic transition triggered by decreasing fertility and 
increasing life expectancy. The demographic transition is marked by two stages. During the first 
stage, the drop in new births reduces the under-age dependency ratio, while the proportion of 
working age population expands. This reduction in dependency ratio due to declining fertility, 
frequently referred to as the demographic bonus, is associated with an increased pace of 
economic development due to the larger share of working age population relative to the total 
population, and the smaller pool of dependents that workers have to support. In the second stage 
of the demographic transition, the consistently low fertility rates in combination with increased 
life expectancy for the elderly, lead to the relative expansion of the old-age dependency ratio. As 
the demographic transition enters the second stage, the demographic bonus deteriorates.  
 
The extent to which Sri Lanka can benefit from the demographic transition depends in many 
ways on labor policies. In the first stage, the demographic transition naturally creates a larger 
labor force which – other things constant – will increase the output in the economy as a whole. 
However, policies that promote labor productivity will augment the magnitude of the 
demographic bonus, e.g., investment in education, vocational and skills training, incentives to 
households to invest in children’s education etc.  
 
As Sri Lanka is going through a demographic transition, it is important to take stock of the ways 
labor income is produced and consumed by different age groups. Similarly, when a deficit or a 
gap between consumption and labor income emerges, it is important to know what type of 
expenditures drive it and how it is financed. This paper documents labor income and 
consumption patterns by age group in Sri Lanka, in a manner that is comparable to work carried 
out for other countries that participate in the National Transfer Accounts Project.
1
 
 
                                                          
1
 Seethe documentation provided by www.ntaccounts.org 
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2. Brief Summary of the National Transfer Accounts Methodology 
 
 
This paper relies on the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) methodology (Lee and Mason, 2004; 
Mason, Lee et al, 2006) in assigning expenditure and income to different age groups. This 
methodology makes it possible to evaluate the magnitude of difference between the amount of 
labor income earned by each age group and its consumption level, or the “life cycle deficit.” For 
working age adults, the lifecycle deficit is usually positive because their age group receives more 
income from labor than it consumes. Age cohorts unable to work – usually the very young and 
the very old – run a negative deficit, consuming more than their labor earnings. Their lifecycle 
deficit is then financed through a combination of public and private transfers and asset 
reallocation, consisting of income from assets (rents, dividends) and dissaving (e.g., sale of 
properties).  
 
Following the NTA methodology, the flow of age reallocations can be described as follows: 
 
(1) YL + YA + TGIN + TFIN = C + S + TGOUT + TFOUT  . 
On the left-hand side, YL stands for labor income; YA represents asset income; while TGIN and 
TFIN denote incoming government and private transfers. On the right-hand side C is household 
consumption, S stands for savings and TGOUT and TFOUT represent outgoing government (i.e., 
taxes) and private transfers. Private transfers in and out include inter- and intra-household 
reallocations. 
 
Life-cycle deficit, or the difference between labor income and consumption can be written as  
 
(2) LCD = YL – C . 
 
However, rearranging (1), LCD can be defined as 
 
(3) LCD = S + TGOUT + TFOUT – YA – TGIN – TFIN = S – YA + TGNET + TFNET  . 
 
Essentially, the life-cycle deficit is the sum of net asset reallocations (savings minus net asset 
income) and net total transfers. 
 
Calculations of age-specific reallocations involve two key steps: (i) calculation of age profiles – 
or the distribution of each NTA component (consumption, labor income, transfers) by age group 
– and (2) application of macro controls. While the calculation of age profiles routinely relies on 
household surveys, macro controls come from national accounts data. 
 
In the case of Sri Lanka, we construct age profiles for income, household consumption, and 
transfers using the data from the 2007 Sri Lanka Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES 2007), the most recent representative household dataset. The details of creation of specific 
NTA components are discussed in Appendix A. 
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3. Discussion of Results 
 
 
Life cycle deficit aggregate view 
 
The vast majority of the labor income is earned by working age individuals 19 to 59 years old, 
who earn nearly 85 percent of all labor income. In the aggregate, consumption is heavily skewed 
toward the younger cohorts (see Figure 1). Children and youth under 19 account for 22 percent 
of private and 26 percent of total (private plus public) consumption, while contributing 2.5 
percent of labor income.   
 
Figure 1: Total Labor Income and Consumption 
 
 
Thus, Sri Lanka’s aggregate age reallocation exhibits a strong downward trend with 
greater proportion of resources flowing toward children. This pattern reflects the large share 
of children in consumption, reflects their large proportion in Sri Lanka’s total population, as well 
as the fact that Sri Lanka is in the relatively early stage of demographic transition. Economies 
that have reached advanced stages of demographic transition, such as the United States or Japan, 
are characterized by the net upward flow of resources toward the elderly, who represent a larger 
proportion of population in developed countries and whose benefits are rather costly (Lee 2002). 
 
By comparison with other countries, Sri Lanka’s life cycle is characterized by a relatively 
early age of negative life cycle deficit. In Sri Lanka, the total life cycle deficit remains positive 
(i.e., total consumption exceeding labor income) through age 21 (see Figure 2). In Germany and 
the Philippines, for example, labor income begins to exceed consumption only by the age 27, 
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versus 22 in Sri Lanka (Mason et al., 2009). In a series of cross-country comparisons, Austria in 
2000, China in 2002, Korea in 2000 and Kenya in 1994 display comparably early age thresholds 
at which youth LCD disappeared (Tung, forthcoming, in Mason, 2009). For majority of the 
countries, the life-cycle deficit turns into surplus between the ages of 24 and 27. In some extreme 
cases – Mexico in 2004 and Brazil in 1996 – the surplus emerges around the age of 30. 
 
On the income side, this pattern is driven by the relatively early age of labor force entry. On the 
consumption side, it is likely linked to a relatively low enrolment rate in local institutions of 
higher learning. Public education expenditure accounts for a sizable share of total consumption at 
younger ages, yet the low supply of opportunities leads Sri Lankan students to seek enrolment at 
colleges and universities abroad. 
 
The total income of persons age 22 to 56 remains higher than their total consumption, but after 
age 57, the life deficit turns positive again. The timing of the old-age deficit is similar to that 
found in Germany and the Philippines.   
 
Notably, the aggregate LCD for the elderly is small, corresponding to the relatively low level of 
old-dependency due to the small share of the elderly in total population. However, as the fertility 
rates decline and life expectancy increases, the children’s share in life cycle deficit will decline 
and the share of the elderly will grow. The relative expansion of the elderly age group will put 
pressure on the working age population to finance the upward transfers, which will require 
considerable improvements in labor force productivity, or – should productivity remain the same 
– expansion of the labor force, for instance through the increase participation of women, or 
increasing the amount of time one works.   
 
The latter two options are less attractive, from the economic point of view, than the first one. 
Expanding labor force participation only provides a short- to medium-term solution to the 
increasing old-dependency problem, since eventually even a labor force with 100 percent 
participation would have to increase productivity to finance the benefits of a continuously aging 
population. Expanding the amount of work is also problematic; Figure 2 indicates that the life 
cycle deficit already turns negative earlier than in a number of comparator economies reflecting 
the fact that an average Sri Lankan starts to work relatively early. Even earlier entry into the 
labor force is often associated with underinvestment in human capital (due to foregone 
schooling), leading to a less skilled labor force, unless complemented by work-study 
arrangements, and loss of productivity since a low-skilled labor force would be unlikely to 
engage in high-value added activities.   
 
Extending the effective time of retirement from the labor force can “transfer” the burden of 
financing the old-age benefits to the elderly themselves. In fact, we already see some of this in 
Sri Lanka: the life-cycle deficit of individuals over 72 begins to shrink – to some extent due to 
continued participation of the elderly in self-employment, which generates moderate income 
flow for some of them while their consumption declines.
2
 However, delaying retirement from the 
labor force can put a considerable stress on the elderly and lead to adverse health outcomes. It is 
likely to be a more viable option when there are robust social safety nets for the elderly already 
in place, e.g., health care, retraining, etc. 
 
                                                          
2
 Another contribution comes from civil service pension payment to former civil servants. 
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Thus, from the economic point of view, increasing productivity of the labor force offers the best 
way to address increasing old-dependency, but it requires additional investment in education and 
vocational training.   
 
Figure 2: Total Life Cycle Deficit (C-YL) 
 
 
 
Lifecycle deficit - per capita view 
 
The per capita life cycle deficit reveals a different picture. The deficit for children and youth 
under 19 is still high, reflecting the fact that the per capita total consumption at lower ages is still 
high due to higher large private and public spending on health, and especially on education. 
However, the per capita value of the life cycle deficit of the elderly is much higher than the 
aggregate view of the life cycle deficit would suggest, driven in large part by the low numbers 
of the elderly. Even though the elderly are able to earn income from their labor activities, their 
per capita expenditures (public and private) are higher as well. Thus in per capita terms, 
consumption by the elderly far exceeds their income and the older they are the greater the deficit. 
 
Figures 3 through 6 illustrate these trends in per capita deficit, consumption and labor. Note that 
to facilitate the cross-country comparisons the y-axis reports the monetary value of per capita 
deficit scaled by the mean labor income of mature working age adults 30 to 49 year old. The 
same scaling adjustment, commonly used in NTA studies, is applied to all figures depicting per 
capita trends. 
 
The high per capita deficit of the elderly implies that as the population ages and old-
dependency ratio grows, the aggregate old-dependency burden will expand more than 
proportionately, assuming the levels of labor income and consumption remain constant. 
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Figure 3: Sri Lanka NTA: Life cycle deficit 
 
 
 
The per capita life cycle deficit of the younger population under 20 reflects their high 
consumption of public services (Figure 4). The nutritional needs of children are lower than 
those of adults, which are reflected in the use of adult equivalence scales in allocating 
consumption between household members. Consequently children’s total level of private 
consumption is low; notwithstanding the fact that their private consumption of health and 
education is relatively high (see Figure 5). Yet their consumption of public education – and to a 
lesser extent public health – is disproportionately high, which accounts for the high total 
consumption of children and youth. 
 
Total consumption increases with age until the mid-60s, despite higher public consumption of 
persons under 25 as a result of continuous growth of private consumption and increasing public 
spending on health after the age of 17.   
 
Increased private consumption reflects the progressively higher private healthcare faced by 
people as they age. This is understandable since aging is associated with more serious health 
problems. Specifically, Figure 6 indicates that per capita private expenditure on healthcare 
rapidly rises in absolute terms for people age 25 and older, reaching 6 percent of median labor 
income of 30 to 49 year olds.   
 
The trend for private healthcare costs to rise in age is observed in many economies. Governments 
usually seek to offset the climbing cost through public provision and or financing health services, 
and Sri Lanka is no exception: per capita public spending on health steadily increases for persons 
17 years of age and older. An important policy question is whether the government spending on 
health is sufficient to control the rising private costs as people age. Figure 6 seems to suggest that 
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public health spending grows in age, but fails to keep pace with the increasing cost of 
healthcare. After the age of 47, private expenditure accounts for more than half of total 
spending on health; and the private share in financing health care costs is even higher for older 
individuals.   
 
Figure 4: Mean Labor Income and Consumption 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Private health and education consumption 
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Another driver of private expenditure is private spending on education. Unsurprisingly, private 
spending on education is high among school-age children and young adults; but what is more 
interesting is that adults age 40 to 55 have the highest per capita private education expenditures 
(Figure 6). The trend reflects the fact that children’s education is heavily subsidized by public 
sources, while very little public support is available for adult education, mostly in the form of 
informal and vocational training. Figure 6 suggests that there is demand for adult learning 
that is currently being met by private expenditure; however, there may be scope for 
additional public investment in adult and informal learning as a way to increase the quality 
and productivity of the labor force. 
 
Figure 6: Private expenditure on health and education 
 
 
 
Our model of private education expenditure estimates that the elderly also report an increased 
spending on education. Recall that the allocation of private education expenditure is estimated 
indirectly by regressing total household education expenditure on the number of persons of a 
given age group associated with change in education consumption. Higher consumption 
spending in households with more elderly members may reflect contributions of grandparents to 
the schooling costs of their grandchildren.  
 
Cross-country comparisons of per capita life cycle deficit 
 
One of the benefits of the NTA methodology is the ability to draw cross-country comparisons. 
Comparator countries, divided into three sets according to the stage of demographic transition, 
are reported in Figures 9 through 11. The comparator graphs of labor income and public and 
private consumption are expressed, as in Figure 3, in scaled units. The available graphs cover a 
wide range of countries and periods corresponding to various stages of economic development 
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and demographic transition. Figure 7 plots the available countries with respect to their total 
fertility rate and proportion of the elderly (65 and older).    
 
European economies (during 2000-2005), USA (2003), and Uruguay (1994) are obviously at 
more advanced stages of the demographic transition. On the other hand, Kenya in 1994 and 
Nigeria in 2004 are at much earlier stages of demographic transition. 
 
In terms of demographic trends, Sri Lanka is closest to Chile in 1997, China in 2002, Costa Rica 
in 2004 and Indonesia in 2005; Brazil in 1996 is also reasonably close. India in 2004 and 
Philippines in 1999 have considerably higher fertility and a lower share of elderly population. 
Despite the fact that Korea is often seen as a relevant example of successful demographic 
transition applicable to Sri Lanka, Korea (2000) is a bit of an outlier in that it has a relatively low 
proportion of the elderly (7.3 percent) for its low fertility rate (1.47). The elderly represent the 
same proportion of the population in Sri Lanka (7.1 percent), but its fertility rate is much higher 
(2.34).  
 
Figure 7: Share of the elderly population and total fertility rate 
 
 
 
However, even economies at comparable stages of demographic transition dramatically differ in 
terms of economic performance and characteristics of the labor force. Figure 8 plots only 
countries with TFR below 3.5 and less than 10 percent of the elderly; the size of the circle 
corresponds to per capita income expressed in constant 2005 PPP dollars. Thus, even though Sri 
Lanka is comparable to Chile (1997) in terms of the elderly share in population and the total 
fertility rate, its GDP per capita is less than one half of Chile’s. Per capita income, in turn, has 
important implications for the allocation of public and private resources to health, education, and 
social protection. 
AUT00
BRA96
CHL97CHN02
CRI04
FIN04
DEU03
HUN05
IND04
IDN05
JPN04
KEN94
KOR00
MEX 4
NGA04PHL99
SVN04
ESP00 SWE03
THA 4
USA03 URY94
0
5
10
15
20
P
op
ul
at
io
n 
65
 a
nd
 o
ld
er
1 2 3 4 5 6
Total fertility
Sri Lanka 2007 
10 
 
Figure 8: Share of elderly population and total fertility rate (expanded view) 
 
 
 
International comparisons – presented in Figures 9 through 11 – point to several patterns.  
 
Sri Lankans start earning income earlier than their peers in other countries and become 
net earners relatively early as well. As one would expect, labor income remains effectively 
zero in the early ages since relatively few children work for pay, and when they do, they are paid 
little. Labor income increases beyond the negligible levels around the age of 15 in most 
countries, even later in developed countries where schooling is close to universal, returns to 
schooling are sizable, and the average household income is high, making the opportunity cost of 
early entry in the labor force an unattractive option. But even compared to most comparable 
countries or even poorer countries at earlier stages of the demographic transition, Sri Lanka 
stands out in terms of the relatively young age of earners. China in 2002 comes closest to Sri 
Lanka; in China, labor income becomes non-negligible relatively early too, around 12 years old.  
 
In Sri Lanka’s case, children 10-11 years old already earn 3 to 4 percent of the wages of prime 
working age adults. Many of these are not wageworkers but work in their families’ businesses or 
farming. According to the NTA methodology, all household members who report working are 
imputed labor income based on the average wage for their age group, even if they did not 
explicitly report wages. Variation in household surveys may also affect the comparability of data 
across countries since the age threshold for asking labor related questions varies from survey to 
survey and from country to country. Some surveys are better at picking up child and youth 
employment than others.  
 
Similar to other countries, the labor income curve in Sri Lanka shows a steep increase around the 
age of fifteen, as a considerable proportion of young people enter the labor force in low-skilled 
occupations after completing primary and lower secondary schooling. Mexico, Brazil, Costa 
Rica and Indonesia, among others, display a similar pattern. Yet Sri Lankan youth still remain 
net total consumers until the age of 21, a relatively young age by international standards, an 
outcome of early age of labor market entry (on the labor income side), and low secondary and 
especially tertiary enrolment rates (on the consumption side).  
The elderly Sri Lankans work longer and earn considerable amounts of labor income well 
into their seventies and eighties. In most other countries, for which national transfer accounts 
graphs are available, labor income declines more drastically for the people after 65. This is 
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especially true of developed countries, where generous public spending on the elderly substitutes 
for the declining labor income. In Sri Lanka, however, public spending flows upward toward the 
young and is centered on education, while persons of advanced age receive little public support. 
Additionally, government and semi-government sectors are large in Sri Lanka, accounting for 
approximately 30 percent of formal labor force; high labor income after 65 reflects a large 
number of relatively high pension payments to public sector retirees. 
 
Among countries of comparable demographic stage and level of income, Brazil (1996), China 
(2002), and less so India (2004) report significant labor income among the seventy and eighty 
year olds; but still they earn less (as proportion of earnings of prime working age adults) than 
their Sri Lankan peers. However, Brazil has nearly double the per capita income of Sri Lanka 
and favors the elderly in public expenditure allocations. Only Nigeria’s elderly (in 2004) worked 
as long as their peers in Sri Lanka and earned similar levels of income. Notably, Nigeria’s public 
spending on the elderly was virtually non-existent.  
 
Sri Lanka’s overall level of public spending is low, but similar to many countries in its 
comparator group: India (2004), China (2002), Thailand (2004), Indonesia (2005), Chile 
(1997), Uruguay (1994). Only Brazil (1996) and Taiwan (1998) have markedly higher public 
spending across all age groups.   
 
Education is the biggest public expenditure item and the greatest source of public assistance 
Sri Lankans receive during their life course. It is concentrated around the primary and 
secondary levels with relatively small per capita expenditure on tertiary schooling. In this, 
Sri Lanka’s early age profile of consumption resembles that of the Philippines (1999) most 
closely: in both cases, education expenditure is lumped around primary schooling. Other 
countries of comparable demographic stage and per capita income allocate more public resources 
toward tertiary schooling, including Thailand (2004), Indonesia (2005), China (2002), India 
(2004), Mexico (2004), and Korea (2000).   
 
However, the general shape of the consumption curve for age 0 through 25 is similar to those of 
many other developing countries, in that past the school age, public expenditure remains 
constant and rather low. By contrast, in OECD and some middle income economies (Brazil in 
1996, Costa Rica in 2004) public per capita consumption is higher at both tails of the age 
distribution: both the young and the elderly receive higher levels of public allocation. For the 
young, public spending is predominantly focused on schooling, while for the elderly on 
healthcare. 
 
What accounts for the small size of public spending relative to private expenditure in Sri Lanka? 
It does not appear that the level of consumption is inordinately large, making the public share 
appear small in comparison. In fact, private consumption levels between 40 and 60 percent of 
labor income among 20 to 60 year olds in Sri Lanka prove to be on the low side. Among other 
countries, only Kenya and China have private consumption significantly lower than Sri Lanka’s.  
So public consumption is low either because of low supply or weak demand for public services, 
or both. On the supply side, the evidence suggests that there exists demand for skills and training 
among 40 to 55 year olds, which is presently met through only private financing. The provision 
of higher education slots also does not meet the demand for tertiary schooling. Similarly, the 
results reported above indicate that public financing of health, especially for the elderly, was not 
keeping pace with the growing cost of healthcare, which had to be absorbed by out-of-pocket 
12 
 
expenditures. On the demand side, problems of access and quality of publicly provided services 
in health and education discourage people from using them. 
 
Figure 9: Sri Lanka versus Developed Countries 
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Figure 10: Sri Lanka versus Developing Countries at Similar Stage of Demographic 
Transition and Economic Development 
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Figure 11: Sri Lanka versus Developing Countries at Earlier Stages of Demographic Transition 
and Economic Development 
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Transfers 
 
Within the national transfer accounts, the life cycle deficit is financed either by transfers or by 
asset reallocation (saving and drawing on savings, or purchasing a house and selling it). In Sri 
Lanka’s context, it is especially important to consider the role of transfers. On the one hand, as a 
matter of policy, the Sri Lankan government pursues an ambitious agenda of social investments. 
On the other, Sri Lanka is a big exporter of labor force, and remittances from Sri Lankan 
residents working abroad represent a significant amount. In the tables below, we consider the 
role of private and public welfare transfer sources, first relative to labor income and then in 
relation to private consumption.   
 
Before considering transfers, two remarks are in order. First, note that public transfers refer to 
social welfare transfers only (dominated by Samurdhi, and disability benefits to soldiers, and 
other household welfare transfers, such programs as Triposha); they do not include flows of 
subsidized health or education services already included under health or education spending 
(e.g., transportation subsidies to students, school meals, textbooks or free checkups).  
 
Secondly, private transfers are by and large recorded as household head’s income, even when the 
intended beneficiary is another household member. Therefore, their age distribution does not 
adequately reflect the age distribution of final consumers of transfers. This is, for instance, true 
of children who legally cannot be recipients of some transfers (e.g., money wired from abroad). 
For this reason, private transfers have been assigned to the household head across the board. This 
explains the zero level of remittance income before the age of 15, and the abrupt increase in 
private remittance after the age of 20. Misallocation of transfers away from the elderly presents 
less of a problem since in the HIES, transfers are recorded at the individual level. 
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Following the NTA methodology, however, public transfers are assigned to the intended 
beneficiary, who in our case is the recipient reported in the HIES. Consequently, Figure 12 
shows that public transfers play a greater role up to the age of 20 than private transfers. 
 
In light of this pattern of assignment of transfers, it is not surprising that both public and private 
transfers play a much smaller role among the younger age groups, with one exception – relative 
to labor income, public transfers prove high among 10 to 15 year olds. The importance of public 
transfers for that age group is due to the low labor income of 10 to 15 year olds. Apart from this 
exception, the contribution of public and private transfers to labor income and 
consumption is greater among older age cohorts (see Figure 13).  
 
Figure 12: Private and public transfers, % private consumption 
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Figure 13: Private and Public transfers, % labor income 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that Sri Lanka is a net receiver of remittances from abroad, the role played 
by remittances is rather modest. They contribute between 4 and 7 percent of labor income after 
the age of 56 and 2.5 percent to 4.5 percent of consumption for the same age group. But the 
relative importance of remittances increases as the labor income declines and the old-age 
life deficit turns positive after the age of 56.   
 
Remittances also record a spike relative to consumption and labor income for the working age 
group of 25 to 40 year olds, whose income from labor is high - the fact that does not fit the logic 
of substitution between transfers and labor income. This is likely an artifact of assigning 
remittances to household heads, who are often the biggest earners in the household.  
 
Public transfers are also modest in size relative to consumption and labor income; even for 
the elderly over the age of 60, they range from just over 2 percent to just under 5 percent of 
labor income and around 2 percent of consumption. This is hardly surprising given that 
schemes included in public transfers tend to target underprivileged groups and do not have large 
coverage. Another reason for low public transfers has to do with the social assistance strategy Sri 
Lanka pursues: it centers on health and education services and some of the education and health 
programs, while programs explicitly designated as public transfers are “top ups” to them. Yet 
after the age of 40, the share of transfers relative to consumption plateaus at about 2 percent, 
despite the intuition that poverty is more prevalent among the elderly. 
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4. Projections 
 
 
Population growth and aging have serious implications for the size and distribution of the life 
cycle deficit. On the one hand, the growing share of the working age population will expand the 
amount of labor income; on the other, expansion of the elderly share of the population will 
augment the deficit among the elderly.   
 
Projections, based on expected age specific population growth trends,
3
 illustrate the growth of 
total labor income and consumption for different age groups (Figure 14). These projections 
assume that the current age profile of labor income and consumption remains constant; the only 
variable that drives the differences between the observed and projected curves is the differential 
population growth for different age groups. Thus, the total labor income expands as the share of 
working persons grows. Since the elderly earn a considerable amount of income, their income 
would also expand, but the total consumption of the elderly will increase even faster. 
 
Figure 14: Observed and Projected Total Labor Income and Total Consumption 
(Public and Private) 
 
 
 
As a result, the total life cycle deficit will expand substantially for the elderly, especially for the 
60 to 75 year olds (Figure 15). For people over 60 years old, demographic change will increase 
the life cycle deficit by more than three fold. The deficit of the young will also grow, but to a 
much smaller extent (9 percent for people under 20) due to low fertility.   
                                                          
3 Projections are based on UN estimates of age specific population growth for 5-year age groups between 2007 and 2040. 
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Figure 15: Observed and Projected Total Life Cycle Deficit (C-YL) 
 
 
It is important to reiterate that these projections do not attempt to take into account possible 
changes in the cost of services, such as health, which – if they were to change – would impact 
the biggest users of health services, the elderly and the very young disproportionately, and would 
alter the projected deficit at the old age. Similarly, no possible additional effects on labor 
income, e.g., due to increased worker productivity, are accounted for.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
Sri Lanka’s aggregate age reallocation exhibits a strong downward trend with greater proportion 
of resources flowing toward children than the elderly, reflecting the large share of children in Sri 
Lanka’s total population. Yet as the demographic transition continues, the share of the elderly in 
the aggregate consumption will increase dramatically to reflect the greater number of the elderly 
surviving to older ages and the higher cost of health care in old age. The life cycle deficit 
projections support this view and predict the deficit for the elderly (65 and older) would grow by 
246 percent, assuming the current pattern of distribution of total labor income and consumption. 
 
Naturally, the expected expansion of old-age deficit will have to be financed one way or another. 
Contrary to expectations, the role played by remittances in financing the life cycle deficit is 
rather limited overall. Even though the transfers play a greater role in financing consumption 
among the elderly, they only account for 2.5 to 4.5 percent of consumption of the elderly.  
 
The contributions of public transfers are also low, even though they do play a greater role for 
people in higher age brackets.  
 
Despite the progressive pattern of remittances and public transfers with age, there are reasons to 
believe that these may be inadequate to offset the growing costs associated with aging, especially 
the cost of healthcare. Given the low public spending on the elderly and modest public transfers 
and remittances, household members have to finance the deficit through a combination of intra-
household transfers, and asset reallocation (dissaving, sale of assets). Sri Lanka’s elderly also 
seek to reduce the deficit by working well past their retirement age.   
 
However, regardless of the nature of the reallocation mechanism, the solution to the problem of 
financing the projected growing numbers of the elderly must center on increasing the 
productivity of the labor force. Income must be generated before it is allocated. Productivity, in 
turn, could be stimulated through increased investment in education and vocational training, both 
for the younger cohorts of low-skilled workers just entering the labor force and for those middle-
aged workers who require retraining.  
 
At the current stage, the lifecycle deficit financing seems to rely less on productivity and more 
on early entry into the labor force and late retirement (driven by informal sector employment, 
since formal sector retirement ages are low) with a non-trivial proportion of the elderly 
continuing to work into their seventies. This is not a sustainable arrangement and efforts to 
increase labor productivity should be made. Public investment in education and vocational 
training is a key means toward this end.  
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Appendix A: Estimation of NTA components for Sri Lanka 
 
Labor income 
 
The age profile for labor income is calculated from the HIES survey data. It includes income 
from wage employment and agricultural and non-agricultural self-employment, as well as civil 
servants’ pensions.4 Consistently with the NTA methodology, 1/3 of self-employment income is 
attributed to labor, and the remaining 2/3 are attributed to assets. 
 
Macro controls on labor income were calculated as follows: compensation to employees plus 
labor’s share of income taxes and taxes on good and services. While the large part of the taxes on 
goods and services (VAT and import taxes) is assigned to consumption, other taxes on 
production should be assigned to labor in proportion to labor income’s share in taxable income.5 
The latter share is calculated from the survey data and is equal to 61 percent. 
Table A1 summarizes the macro-control parameters used for aggregate controls on income. 
Labor income should also be adjusted upward to account for some taxes on production and 
income, which are passed on to workers in the form of lower wage rates. 
 
Table 1: Aggregate Control Parameters for Income, 2007, Millions Rs.  
 
Labor income aggregate controls Millions Rs. 
Compensation to employees (a) 1869325 
Development subsidies (b) 11239 
Sources: (a) CEIC dataset of SL National accounts.  
(b) Treasury of GoSL (2008) Financial Statements for the Year Ending on December 31, 
2007. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 In HIES, social pensions are not distinguished from civil servant pensions.  To distinguish between the two we applied the cutoff value of 7200 
rupees per year.  The cutoff was calculated as follows: since there are two social pensions, which pay approximately 200 to 300 rupees per 
month, any given individual is unlikely to receive more than 600 rupees per month in social pensions; the annual cutoff amount for the two 
pensions is 600*12=7200 rupees. 
5 Taxable income is defined as income from all sources, except welfare payments (but including civil servants' pensions). 
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The following aggregate controls were applied to the calculation of taxes (Table A2). 
Table 2: Aggregate Control Parameters for Taxes, 2007, Millions Rs. 
TAXES  
Taxes related to consumption 324273 
(1) VAT/G&S 187452 
Alcohol 23723 
Tobacco 31437 
Petrol 17126 
(2) Stamp Duties/ Cess Levy/ Social Responsibility 
Levy/RIDL/SCL 
25715 
(3) Port and AirPort Development Levy 26700 
Taxes on foreign trade 84406 
Tax related to both labor and assets 
Other taxes on production 46290 
of these the labor part is 60.691% 28094 
Income tax 107168 
of these the labor part is 60.691% 65041 
Taxes related to labor only  
Social security contributions 8777 
TOTAL TAXES FOR ADJUSTING LABOR INCOME 101912 
  
 
Consumption 
 
We distinguish between private and public consumption, and within each of these, three distinct 
components are identified: expenditure on health, expenditure on education, and other 
expenditure. Separate age profiles are calculated for each of these components.   
 
Private consumption. To calculate private health expenditure age profile, we assign household-
level health expenditure to individual members based on their health service utilization rate from 
the HIES data. The total household health expenditure is regressed on the number of household 
members within a given age group, which used inpatient and outpatient services.  
 
Private expenditure on education - collected at the household level - is allocated to individual 
household members indirectly using and OLS regression analysis. Household expenditure on 
education is modeled as a function of the number of household members enrolled at each level of 
schooling (primary, secondary, tertiary, not-enrolled
6
) by age category. The regression 
coefficient in then interpreted as the cost associated with attendance at a given level of schooling 
of an additional household member of a given age. 
 
Other private consumption is allocated according to the consumption age profile based on adult 
equivalency weights.  
 
Aggregate controls on private consumption are summarized in Table A3. Because the 
disaggregation of household consumption into health and education was not available for 2007, 
2006 values were used to make 2007 projections. 
                                                          
6 Non-enrolled members can still have education expenditures on informal schooling. 
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Table 3: Private Consumption Aggregate Controls, Millions Rs 
 
Total household consumption (2007) 2403167 
Household consumption, health (2006) 72827 
Household consumption, education (2006) 30346 
Total household consumption (2006) 1988378 
Adjustment to 2006 levels of private consumption of health 
services and education (a) 
2403167/1988378 
Private consumption, health (2007) 88019 
Private consumption, education (2007) 36676 
(a) Proportionate to increase in total private consumption 
Sources: Sri Lanka National Accounts from CEIC database  
Public consumption. Public health expenditure age profile is based on age-specific utilization 
rates of inpatient and outpatient care, which were then applied to the current public spending on 
inpatient and outpatient services. Public preventative services expenditures were allocated 
proportionately to population size; while expenditures on medical goods and other health 
expenditures are allocated proportionately to the utilization rates of inpatient and outpatient 
services. 
 
Public education is financed from the central government budget at the tertiary level, while 
primary and secondary schooling is financed from central and provincial government budgets. 
Thus, we consider general government spending, the total of central and provincial expenditures, 
allocated to age groups based on the age profile for enrolment at each age.  
 
Public expenditure on education includes the cost of tuition, subsidized transportation,
7
 and - for 
primary and secondary students - supplies, and uniforms, and nutritional support for 
underprivileged children. Free uniforms and nutritional support could also be classified as 
transfers; however, we consider them together with educational spending because they are 
financed by the ministry of education and counted as part of education expenditure; furthermore, 
their allocation is consistent with the age profile for enrolment. 
                                                          
7 School transportation is subsidized at 90 percent of regular transportation costs for primary and secondary students and at 70 percent for 
university students. 
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Table 4: Aggregate Control Parameters for Current Public Expenditure on Education in 
Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Education, 2007, Millions Rs. 
 
Category  Millions Rs. 
Personal Emoluments 58,467 
Welfare programs 13886 
Text books 2,250 
Uniforms 1,067 
Scholarships 185 
Nutritional food 1,925 
Season tickets 250 
Other 8,209 
Total 72,353 
Source: Sri Lanka Ministry of Finance and Planning (2007). Annual Report 2007. Page 121.  
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Detailed macro-level inputs for calculating public expenditure are reported in Table A5. 
 
Table 5: Aggregate Controls on Public Expenditure, 2007, Millions Rs. 
 
Total current expenditure of general government (a) 622758 
  
Public spending on education (b) 76343 
Primary 22304 
Central 20475 
Provincial 1829 
Secondary 39584 
Central 31643 
Provincial 7942 
Special education 2231 
Central 129 
Provincial 2102 
Vocational 1867 
Tertiary 10357 
Public spending on health (2007) (a) 54737 
Total current spending (public and private) on health (2005) (c) 
 inpatient 39864 
 outpatient  24869 
 medical goods  26139 
 preventive care 6476 
other  7653 
Overall 105001 
Share of public by type of health services (2005) (c) 
 inpatient 0.72 
 outpatient  0.35 
 medical goods  0.1 
 preventive care 0.86 
other  0.24 
Public spending on health by type of health service, imputed for 2007 
 inpatient 14962 
 outpatient  4537 
 medical goods  1363 
 preventive care 2903 
other  957 
Source: (a) Ministry of Finance and Planning (2007) Annual report 2007;  
(b) Provided by Sri Lanka team, but consistent with Annual report 2007; 
(c) Health Policy Research Institute (2007). Population Ageing and Health Expenditure: Sri Lanka 2001-2101. 
 
Transfers: public, private  
 
Private transfers are calculated as a total of foreign and domestic remittances, as well as in-kind 
gifts.   
Domestic and foreign remittances data are collected in the income section of the HIES survey; 
the values of the two types of remittances is collected separately. The aggregate controls for 
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foreign remittances come from the Sri Lanka national accounts and are allocated based on the 
age profile of heads of households receiving such remittances. 
 
In-kind gifts exclude “gifted” material for uniforms, because the latter is publicly provided and 
should be considered a public transfer. However, gifted ready-made uniforms and free uniform 
tailoring services are counted in private transfers, because they fall outside of the scope of public 
transfers to school children. The value of publicly provided uniforms is included in education 
expenditure. 
 
Public transfers are dominated by Samurdhi benefit payments (Rs. 9200 million), and disability 
payments (to disabled soldiers) at Rs. 7428 million; other welfare benefits amount to Rs. 5726 
million. These transfers do not include development subsidies (agriculture, fuel, etc.). To allocate 
welfare transfers we use the age-specific expenditure profile obtained from HIES, which is an 
aggregate of Samurdhi, disability, and social pensions (pensions other than civil servant 
pensions).  
 
Table 6: Aggregate Control Parameters for Transfers, 2007, Millions Rs. 
Transfers, Millions Rs.  
Public welfare transfers   
Samurdhi 9200 
Disabled soldiers 7428 
Other 5746 
Private transfers  
Total foreign remittances 276771.24 
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